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The purpose of this paper is to analyse whether scal policies can alleviate the eects of
the zero lower bound (ZLB) on interest rates and if they should be coordinated internation-
ally. The analysis is carried out using EAGLE, a DSGE model of the global economy. We
consider that the scal shocks are temporary and that scal policy retains full credibility at
all times. In this setup we nd signicant non-linearities in a ZLB situation that amplify the
eects of scal shocks compared to the non-ZLB case. International coordination is helpful
but does not play a major role in the results.
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11 Introduction and motivation
The recent economic and nancial crisis was characterised by a steep slowdown that was strongly
synchronised across the globe. Central banks used the instruments at their disposal to provide
liquidity to banks and signicantly cut interest rates to very low levels to counteract downside
risks to price stability and, in some cases, to avoid outright deation. Interest rates have been
driven to close to zero in major economic areas which has rekindled the debate about the policy
options available in a zero lower bound (ZLB) situation and their impact on the economy.
Several solutions to the ZLB have been put forward focusing on alternative ways of conducting
monetary policies, such as price-level targeting (as opposed to ination targeting) as in Svensson
(1999), Svensson (2003), Dittmar, Gavin, and Kydland (1999) or Vestin (2006), or exchange-
rate targeting as in Meltzer (1999), Svensson (2001), Coenen and Wieland (2004) or McCallum
(2000). Some other threads in the literature have tackled the ZLB with a particular focus on
nancial environments, such as the analysis of the balance sheet of the central bank, e.g. Jeanne
and Svensson (2007) or Auerbach and Obstfeld (2005); or ghting the ZLB through purchase of
illiquid assets, e.g. Goodfriend (2000), or the provision of Gesell money, e.g. Goodfriend (2000) or
Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (1999). This paper is part of another strand of the literature that looks
at the use of scal policy instruments as a way to overcome a ZLB situation. Recent examples
are the analysis of scal multipliers in Romer and Bernstein (2009), Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo (2009) Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2009), Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri
(2009) and in Erceg and Lind e (2010).1
Our approach consists in conducting a series of simulations of scal shocks in a ZLB environ-
ment with EAGLE, a large scale global DSGE model.2 The model is well suited for our goals
in many dimensions. First, it can handle global shocks as it has four blocs whose calibration
broadly corresponds to Germany, the rest of the euro area, the Unites States and the rest of
the world. Second, it includes a rich scal sector that allows testing the eects of dierent scal
1Note that as in Erceg and Lind e (2010) the duration of the liquidity trap is also here endogenous.
2For an analysis of scal policy at zero rates in a closed economy model of the US economy see also Eggertsson
(2009).
2policy instruments. Third, by incorporating forward-looking behaviour and including a mix of
Ricardian and non-Ricardian consumers {the latter unable to access nancial markets{, EAGLE
can be used to analyse the role of expectations which, as argued by Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and
Wieland (2009), matter for the eects of scal policy. Note however that the only scal shocks
analysed in this paper are temporary ones: permanent scal measures bring with them complex
terminal-condition and transition issues that deserve by themselves a study apart.3
The simulation exercises consist in rst inducing a deep recession through exogenous demand
shocks of sucient strength to drive the economy (output and ination) strongly down, which
leads to the ZLB via the reaction of monetary policy. We then simulate expansionary scal
shocks that overcome the ZLB, assess their eectiveness in countering the ZLB and also the
scope for international policy co-ordination.4 Finally, we conduct simulations on the impact
of the announced scal stimulus packages in a ZLB situation. We conrm the ndings in other
studies that scal policy becomes signicantly more powerful in the presence of a ZLB constraint,
in particular in the US and especially regarding its eects on ination. We also nd that some
scal measures can considerably shorten the duration of a ZLB episode. Fiscal shocks generate
some spillovers across countries but these are small relative to the direct impact of domestic
scal measures.
An important aspect of the simulations conducted is that we assume a return to the initial
level of public debt. This is assumed to take place through the announcement, together with the
scal stimulus package, of a scal consolidation on exit. Agents believe the announcement and
expect a future scal tightening, i.e. a period of below-baseline scal decit, to bring debt down.5
3For an analysis of scal multipliers associated with both temporary and permanent measures see for example
Coenen, Erceg, Freedman, Furceri, Kumhof, Lalonde, Laxton, Lind, Mourougane, Muir, Mursula, de Resende,
Roberts, Roeger, Snudden, Trabandt, and in't Veld (2010). Other issues of relevance that will not be touched upon
in this paper in the interest of brevity are the stability and equilibrium \pathologies" issues tackled elsewhere
in the literature, see e.g. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001), Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe
(2002), Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003), Alstadheim and Henderson (2006) or Christiano and Rostagno (2001)
in a rational-expectations environment, or in McCallum (2000), Evans and Honkapohja (2005) in a learning one;
nor the issue of the eects of gradual monetary policies as opposed to activist ones, see e.g. Goodfriend (1991),
Woodford (1999), Reifschneider and Williams (2000) or Gaspar, Smets, and Vestin (2007).
4Fiscal exit strategies from the ZLB through boosting the economy have also been analysed in Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001) and Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2002), in the same spirit as done in
this paper but using small-scale, purpose-built models.
5Note that the unwinding of the scal stimulus described later in the text does not end scal moves: the
scal rule in EAGLE imposes a long-lasting tightening (using lump sum taxes) to ensure a return of debt to its
3This policy does indeed help in boosting the eects of the initial scal stimulus, see Corsetti,
Kuester, Meier, and M uller (2010). The solvency of the Government is in this way always assured
in the simulations. It should be stressed that the scal multipliers could be signicantly reduced
or even change sign if the expansionary policies lead to a loss of credibility of the scal authority.6
The text is structured along two broad lines: rstly, an exposition of how a recession leading
EAGLE to the ZLB was engineered; secondly, an analysis of alternative scal measures aimed at
avoiding or shortening the ZLB episode. Section 2 presents briey the model, followed by section
3 which explains the steps taken to make EAGLE hit the ZLB. Section 4 then explores the
alternative scal exercises that form the bulk of the analysis. Section 5 tackles the related point
of comparing the resulting scal multipliers when the ZLB has been hit and in more normal
circumstances. Section 6 builds on the previous analysis to assess the impact on EAGLE of
existing scal programmes. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model: a brief presentation of EAGLE
The EAGLE (Euro Area and the Global Economy) model is a multi-country DSGE model of the
euro area in the world economy, described in detail in Gomes, Jacquinot, and Pisani (2010). In
the euro area monetary union we dierentiate two blocs: Germany and the rest of the euro area.
The other two blocs in the model are the US and the rest of the world.
Each country/bloc comprises households, rms and a monetary and scal authority. Each
household is innitely lived, consumes a nal good7 and supplies labour to all domestic rms
in a monopolistic market. We assume wages are sticky  a la Calvo (1983), with indexation.
Households decide how to allocate their time between work and leisure. A fraction of households
does not have access to capital markets and has to nance consumption exclusively through
disposable labour income. The remaining households own the domestic capital stock, which
pre-simulation level.
6The empirical estimates of scal multipliers show considerable heterogeneity, with a number of studies showing
negative multipliers for some countries, see for example Perotti (2005). Spilimbergo, Symansky, and Schindler
(2009) provide a recent survey on scal multipliers.
7We assume habit persistence in consumption.
4they rent to domestic rms that they also own. They buy and sell two bonds, one issued
domestically in domestic currency and the other is an international bond issued in zero net
supply worldwide. When households sell or purchase the international bond they pay a premium
to nancial intermediaries. The size of this premium is a function of the aggregate net asset
position of the country and therefore can be seen as reecting the cost of intermediation. In the
case of the monetary union, we assume there is a bond denominated in the common currency
which is traded across the countries member of the union. Again this bond incorporates an
intermediation cost with the purpose of guaranteeing the stationarity of the model.8 Labour and
physical capital are immobile internationally. The market for capital is competitive, and capital
accumulation is subject to adjustment costs.
In what regards the production side, there are rms producing nal goods and a continuum
of dierentiated intermediate goods. In each country there are three nal goods produced in
a perfectly competitive market: a consumption good, an investment good and a public good.
Consumption and investment nal goods are a produced by using all available intermediate goods
as inputs using Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) technology and allowing for home bias,
whereas the public good is a composite of only non-tradable intermediate goods. There are many
varieties of intermediate goods, each produced by a single rm under monopolistic competition.
Prices are sticky  a la Calvo (1983), with indexation. Each intermediate good is produced by using
domestic labour and domestic capital, combined with a Cobb-Douglas technology. Intermediate
goods are either non-traded or traded internationally. Final goods are produced with non-traded
intermediate goods, domestic traded goods and imported traded goods. Imports are subject to
short-term adjustment costs that temporarily lower the response of demand to changes in relative
prices. There is international price discrimination since rms set prices in the currency of the
importing country.
The government purchases the public good and nances its expenditures with public debt
8The introduction of the euro area bond is a technicality, related to the need of imposing that the same interest
rate level holds in both regions in the monetary union and that the bilateral nominal exchange rate between these
regions is constant. Note that this cost does not take into account any aspect linked to sovereign risk and so the
debt of all the countries in the Union is (and is so perceived by the markets) as default-free. For more details on
the monetary union please see Gomes, Jacquinot, and Pisani (2010).
5and taxes on the domestic private sector. There are lump-sum and distortionary taxes, levied
on the price of consumption, the rental rate of capital and wages. Standard scal rules that
target the level of public debt ensure scal stability in each bloc. The monetary authority sets
the national short-term nominal interest rate by means of a Taylor-type interest rate rule. In
the case of the euro area, the central bank sets the interest rate for all the country members on
the basis of area-wide indicators. For the simulations in this paper, we also assume that interest
rates are bounded from below at zero.
Regarding the calibration of the model, the steady-state ratios have been set to match actual
national accounts data and the key behavioural parameters have been chosen using information
from the existing literature, some of which are invariant across countries while others have
been modied to match country-specic information, such as the steady-state ratios of nominal
domestic demand components to GDP. The bias towards domestic tradable goods and the weight
of non-traded goods in the consumption and investment baskets are set to match the shares of
imported and services goods in the considered economy, given the values of the intratemporal and
intertemporal elasticities of substitution.9 Nominal and real rigidities allow to produce realistic
dynamic adjustment patterns. Monetary policy authorities are assumed to target ination. We
assume identical calibration of the Taylor rules in all the blocs.10 For all blocs, the ination
target is set at 2 percent. The calibration of the scal policy rule is standard. The parameter
measuring the reaction of taxes to public debt is set to achieve debt sustainability and hence
model stability.
3 Hitting the bound
The goal of this section is to introduce the basic mechanism used in EAGLE to induce a recession
and deation and drive the model into the ZLB constraint. In the exercise, it is assumed that a
sequence of unexpected shocks hit the global economy for as long as needed to ensure that the
9The calibration is fully reported in Gomes, Jacquinot, and Pisani (2010).
10The benchmark calibration of EAGLE assumes a smoothing parameter of 0.87, parameter on ination of 2
and parameter on output growth of 0.77. For this paper we change the rule somewhat, as explained in the next
section.
6ZLB is hit.11 For obvious reasons, domestic demand shocks were preferred: domestic on account
of the muted international spillover eects common to most DSGE models; shocks to demand to
ensure that ination and output both decrease, a reection of the current situation.
In practice, consumption and investment are shocked for 6 consecutive periods. Agents
correctly forecast the results of each shock as they hit the economy, but are unaware of the
future shocks about to hit. The number of shocks is sucient to drive the interest rate to the
bound for a suciently long period of time{in practice, for around a couple of years, depending
on the country. The situation is similar to one in which factors not included in the model
aect agents' condence, such as a sequence of bad news regarding the nancial health of the
banking sector. Since EAGLE does not include a fully-edged banking sector, this behaviour
can be approximated by assuming that consumers and rms' condence erodes gradually over
the period.
The literature has touched upon the exact level of the lower bound on interest rates, see
e.g. Yates (2004), McCallum (2000) or Buiter (2005), which may dier slightly from zero due to
potential costs from holding money or gains from using it. Furthermore, it may be argued that
central banks tend to recoil from setting their policy rates at exactly zero, for reasons of nancial
stability. But for the sake of simplicity, the denition adopted in the exercises below has been
for the lower bound to lie exactly at zero.12
Compared to the original version of EAGLE in Gomes, Jacquinot, and Pisani (2010), the
parameters in the monetary policy rules were also changed, in order to ensure a faster response
of policy to the developments in the economy: the parameter attached to the lagged interest rate
in the rules was set to zero. The rationale for this change rests on the idea that central banks
change their policy faster in view of the extreme circumstances faced. This change has led to a
faster reduction in interest rates and an earlier onset of the ZLB condition, in reection of actual
events in 2008/2009. Needless to say, this is just a technical device used in the simulation, as
11Shocks come in sequence, instead of as a single very large shock, to avoid an immediate entry into the ZLB.
The alternative would have led to less room for policy analysis, such as the analysis of pre-announcement eects.
12The ZLB was introduced into the model by using the maximum function in the policy rule, such that a zero
rate would be returned in case the rule would imply a negative number.
7opposed to an actual policy recommendation.
To ensure a smoother exercise, the steady state real interest rate was set at 1% p.a., as against
3% in the standard calibration of the model. This change eased the numerical diculties of the
exercise, but is also a reection of the average real rate over the period 1999 to 2009, which
hovers slightly above 1%. In the period, the 3-month interbank rate, the most common proxy for
policy rates used in DSGE models of the euro area, averaged around 3.3%, while HICP ination
averaged around 2.1%.
Shocks are assumed to take place in every bloc in the model, simultaneously, over the said 6
consecutive quarters. The shocks are unexpected, i.e. agents each time think the sequence of bad
news is over. The shocks are similar across periods, and amount to roughly 4% of consumption
and 0.2% of Tobin's Q ex-ante, both reecting an assumed drop in condence by agents. Results
will be presented and discussed for alternative congurations: rstly, with and without the ZLB
condition implemented in the model, to assess its impact; second, assuming the scal shocks are
implemented only in one economic area (euro area or the US) but not in the other blocs, to
assess inter-bloc spillover eects.
3.1 Results
The results of the recessionary shocks are reported in Figure 1, which includes the impact in
euro area (EA) and in the US annualised consumer price ination (in percentage points), GDP
(in % deviation from the steady state), the short-term interest rate (in percentage points) and
consumption (in % deviation from the steady state). The gure starts in the period previous to
the shock and shows results for the rst 6 years, i.e. the pre-shock period plus the following 24
quarters. The gure shows the benchmark 6-quarter global recession shock in the presence and
in the absence of the ZLB. The simulation without the ZLB imposed (negative rates are allowed)
helps in highlighting the impact of the ZLB restriction, but in practice is an impossibility.
Starting with the euro area, the paths followed by ination, output and consumption do
not dier much in the ZLB and the no-ZLB cases, even though in the latter case interest rates
8Figure 1: Global and EA recession and the ZLB
















































































































actually become negative. However, it should be noted that the shock we are imposing on the
model is rather large and so interest rate policy alone (assuming the central bank continues to
follow the same monetary policy rule) would not be able to counteract the induced recession.
Interestingly, the results for the US suggest that the same global shock would imply a larger
decline in real economic activity and especially in the rate of change in prices, which actually
becomes negative. The duration of the ZLB episode would be longer in the case of the US than
in the euro area. Thus, it seems that the \costs" of the ZLB restriction are higher in the case of
the US than in the case of the euro area.13
Another interesting fact is that the model smoothly returns to the steady state in all cases.
The model thus shows no explosive behaviour in the ZLB, a theoretical possibility, see Benhabib,
13The source of this discrepancy was tracked to be caused by the higher nominal persistence in the euro area.
Results for the euro area matched the US results shown when the Calvo parameters in the euro area were brought
down to the US levels. Note that the ZLB is avoided (just) when running the same recession shock in the EA
only, i.e. without spillover eects from the rest of the world. Spillover eects in the model, described as small
later, are nevertheless signicant.
9Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2002), and seems instead to enter a region of indeterminacy.14 It
seems reasonable to expect that expectations are one of the main factors behind the exit from the
ZLB. The fact that agents expect ination to be positive and output to return to more normal
growth eventually would guarantee, under indeterminacy, an exit from the ZLB condition at some
stage, with neither scal nor monetary policy directly doing the job. In a sense, the outcome is
achieved through managing agents' expectations.
A caveat applies here: revisions of beliefs by agents (or outright panics) could induce an
explosive deationary spiral in the model. Since monetary policy can no longer steer the economy
through changes in interest rates, any expectations of continued deation would go unchecked.
The fact that EAGLE recovers by itself from a ZLB episode must not be construed as implying a
policy prescription for monetary passivity. The model embodies full monetary policy credibility,
i.e. a credible ination target, but does not include mechanisms to enforce it in a ZLB episode.
Fiscal policy may help in such a situation, but explicit additional monetary policy action may
be required, such as e.g. liquidity measures or changes to the policy target (see literature cited
in the introduction for exercises of this kind).
4 The scal reaction
To assess how scal policy can counteract the induced recession, we have considered a set of
stylised scal shocks aecting each one a specic budgetary item: Government consumption,
consumption tax rates, transfers and wage income tax rates. Stylised simulations allow the
isolation of the eects of scal policies, whereas actual scal programmes normally include a
mix of measures whose impact in isolation is dicult to disentangle. Furthermore, they allow
for an easier understanding of alternatives in scal planning. An analysis of actual (complex)
scal plans is left for section 6. In this section, instead, we explore simple exercises and, as
14It is not easy to ascertain whether it is the case that the model is indeterminate. One test made was to
calculate the dynamic roots of the model linearised around a steady state in which the ZLB held{by either setting
the terminal ination rate suciently low to force a terminal null nominal rate, or by articially increasing the
threshold for the ZLB above zero. The roots indicated that there were 3 indeterminate conditions, in accordance
with the number of independent monetary policies in the model. The model under standard conditions is stable
and determinate.
10a complement, we study the impact of asymmetric implementation of policies, i.e. subjecting
dierent blocs in the model to dierent scal shocks.15
Note that the simulations reported below are more complex than the simple shocks normally
used to report scal multipliers.16 Note also that no permanent scal shocks are reported,
these being out of the scope of this paper. Permanent scal shocks are documented elsewhere
(see Coenen, Mohr, and Straub (2008) or Cogan, Cwik, Taylor, and Wieland (2009) for recent
exercises) and result in signicant terminal-condition issues and transition eects, from one
steady state to another, that do not shed light on the interaction between the ZLB and scal
policy.
One important element worth mentioning is the type of scal rule used in the exercises to
stabilise the model, i.e. to ensure proper return to the stady-state. The rule used is the standard
one in EAGLE, which stabilises debt and decit by endogenising lump-sum taxes for Ricardian
consumers. This implies, in practice, that scal policy experiments are not impaired by the eect
of rule-induced changes in distortionary taxes.17
Finally, it should be noted that we assume that government actions have no eects on the
risk premium for public-sector debt. If this assumption were to be dropped, the eects of scal
policy reported in the next sections would be reduced.
4.1 The raw exercise
In this section, we assume that all countries/blocs in the model implement simultaneously the
same simple scal measure (i.e., dierent expenditure increases or tax decreases) as a response
to the global recession. The simultaneous global scal shocks, all designed to represent ex-ante
around 2.5% of GDP, are:
 An increase in Government consumption;
15Note that we have conducted extensive sensitivity analysis, some reported below. One worth noting at this
stage is the similarity of results across blocs when the value of key parameters were made equal in the euro area
and US blocs, in particular regarding the eectiveness of the scal measures in exiting the ZLB.
16Standard scal multipliers for EAGLE can be found in Gomes, Jacquinot, and Pisani (2010).
17The results did not change substantially when a scal closure rule in terms of wage-income taxes, which are
distortionary, was used.
11 A decrease of taxes to consumption;18
 An increase in transfers to households;
 A decrease in the income tax rate (which in EAGLE falls mainly on wage income).
Note that a decrease in Social Security contributions paid by households is not reported due
to the similarity of the results to those of the income tax simulation.
One aspect of the simple exercises is an analysis of announcement eects. It is well-known
that the implementation of scal measures takes some time, implying that they are normally
announced some time before they are enacted. This is a feature worth exploring in EAGLE. The
simple exercises reported below have thus been implemented with a specic time frame: it is
assumed that scal authorities announce the measure in the fourth period of the recession, when
the rst four shocks have hit the economy but two others remain in the pipeline, unknowingly to
the scal authorities.19 Furthermore, the actual implementation is credibly announced to start
one period after the announcement, i.e. in the 5th period.20 The policy is announced to be
slowly withdrawn after 12 periods of it being active, with a withdrawing rate afterwards of 20%
of the original measure per period. This gradual fading away of the measure serves the purpose
of smoothing out the exit from policy in the results reported, but has otherwise no substantive
implication.
Thus, agents in the model know at that time about the rst four recession shocks and the
entire history of future policy. When the subsequent recession shocks hit (up to a maximum of
6), they revise their expectations regarding the overall impact of the demand shock, but their
view of scal policy is not changed. Agents are assumed to be rational, so they expect hits to
the ZLB whenever the condition is relevant. They also expect a return to normal, non-ZLB
18In the calibration of the steady state level of the consumption tax rates we follow Coenen, McAdam, and
Straub (2008). In the case of the euro area the tax on consumption corresponds to the VAT rate while in the case
of the US it corresponds to the average of state plus maximum local sales tax rates. For the sake of simplicity,
we will henceforth refer to the US consumption tax as VAT tax.
19This choice is obviously arbitrary. It was adopted because delaying the announcement to the fth period
implied that the scal reaction would be implemented with the economy deeply in the ZLB, which might have
blunted the analysis.
20Longer pre-announcement periods were also tested, leading to stronger quantitative impacts of pre-announcing
policies. Qualitative results, though, were in line with those reported.
12Figure 2: Fiscal reactions to the ZLB recession: euro area























































































































The simulation results for the euro area and the US are included in Fig. 2 and 3, and are
explained below in specic sub-sections.
Government consumption shock
The government consumption shock is fairly successful in bringing the economy back from the
doldrums. The ZLB is no longer reached in the case of the euro area and in the case of the US the
time spent in the ZLB is basically halved, which brings the benet of a shorter deationary period.
Furthermore, it aects directly demand and GDP. Accordingly, ination is also signicantly
13Figure 3: Fiscal reactions to the ZLB recession: US
































































































































14impacted. The counterpart is the heavily negative impact on consumption, even though 25%
of consumers are assumed to be nancially constrained. As in Coenen and Straub (2005), the
positive eect the increased demand has on non-Ricardian consumers is mostly oset by the deep
negative impact on Ricardian consumers. The nal multiplier is thus negative for consumption.
Note that announcement eects are clearly visible, as indeed in the other simulations. The
most notable eect is in the interest rate itself, which dips on announcement before briey spiking
on implementation of the policy. This behaviour follows, with some amplication, the movements
in GDP, itself a consequence of the change in government consumption and, to a much lesser
extent, trade. Private consumption, on the other hand, is quietly smoothed out over this period.
VAT tax shock
The decrease of VAT has a more muted impact on the overall economy. Time spent in the ZLB is
shorter than without the policy action and GDP is positively aected, hardly a surprise, but only
very gradually. More noteworthy is the eect on consumption which, compared to the baseline,
increases markedly in the euro area and the US once the policy is actually implemented. In
both economic areas it is the scal policy measure that best counteracts the fall in consumption,
though not of GDP. Contrary to what could be expected, ination is higher than the baseline,
reecting a relatively powerful demand-boost eect able to more than oset the impact of the
reduction in VAT.
Transfers
The model includes two types of transfers, according to the type of consumer aected by them.
One part is paid to Ricardian agents and the other to non-Ricardian ones; the shares are such
that the latter receive per head 2 times the amount paid to the former. Since transfers are a
lump-sum payment, Ricardian agents pay no notice of temporary shifts to them, whereas non-
Ricardian agents do because they have to spend or save them. This implies that transfers will be
able to aect outcomes only to the extent that they are received by non-Ricardian consumers.
The impact of the change in transfers on output is relatively complex: in the case of the
15euro area GDP is in fact negatively aected, while the impact on consumption is in the middle
range of the simulated scal measures. This result comes about because of the diering impact
of the shock on the two types of consumers. Non-Ricardian consumers increase their demand
and push the activity strongly upwards, which in turn implies that policy makers need to tighten
policy a bit earlier than in the other cases. This obviously has a negative eect on Ricardian
consumers and investors, who face higher interest rates than otherwise. Total consumption is
only mildly aected because of a composition eect: it embodies a strong positive reaction from
non-Ricardian agents and a strong negative reaction from Ricardian ones.21 The important drop
in GDP is caused by a sizeable negative reaction of investment. Ination, on the other hand, is
slightly higher than in the other simulations. Finally, announcement eects are also visible but
more muted than in the case of the Government spending shock.
Income tax
In contrast to the other scal measures, the income tax simulation does not help in accelerating
the exit from the ZLB: in fact, it lengthens it. The reason for this is that the reduction in income
tax leads to deationary pressures in the model as it turns out to be a supply-side shock. In fact,
the reduction of income taxes amounts to a negative cost-push shock in the case of rms (i.e.
it decreases the marginal costs of rms) and an incentive for households to raise their labour
supply. The net eect is that output expands much more than in the other exercises, especially
on exit from the ZLB. The expansion of supply has a negative impact on ination, which sinks
(getting back to deation in the case of the US). Given the assumed monetary policy rule, the
interest rate ends up returning to the ZLB. Thus, this policy is not an eective way to overcome
the ZLB episode as it heightens the risk of prolonged deation.22 The announcement eects for
this shock are muted.
21This composition eect is a robust feature of EAGLE, such that changes in the share of non-Ricardian
consumers brings little in terms of changes in the reaction of total consumption. The only exception is precisely
the transfers simulation, totally ineective if there are no non-Ricardians
22On the perils of labour tax cuts when interest rates are bounded at zero see also Eggertsson (2009).
164.2 Asymmetric scal measures
We continue the analysis of the impact of scal measures in a ZLB framework by simulating
asymmetric congurations of scal measures, i.e. we no longer assume that all blocs in the
model implement simultaneously the same scal measures. Instead, we now investigate the
impact of asymmetric, though still stylised, scal measures. In particular, we simulate the same
global recessionary shock and assume that there is a gradual decrease of the VAT tax rate in the
euro area, leading to a decline in tax revenue of around 2.5% of GDP ex-ante, while in the US
and the Rest of the World there is no change in scal policy. We also simulate a gradual increase
in government consumption of 2.5% of GDP ex-ante in the US assuming that the euro area and
the rest of the world do not take any scal measure.23 The timing and size of the temporary
recessionary shocks and of the temporary scal measures is the same as in the previous section.
Results are shown in Fig. 4. The rst thing to stress in the gure is that the responses
of the variables in each bloc are similar to the ones in the case of a unilateral scal response,
implying that the spillovers of the scal measures across blocs are relatively small. Therefore,
there are costs of domestic inaction, as the benets to one bloc of scal measures in another bloc
are limited. The increase in government spending is more eective in shortening the time spent
in the ZLB. Also, GDP presents a bigger fall in the euro area than in the US. However, in the US
the increase in government spending crowds out private consumption, aggravating the decline in
consumption induced by the recessionary shocks, while the opposite happens in the euro area,
where the decrease in the VAT tax rate stimulates consumer purchases, as seen in the previous
section.
Annual ination shows a more pronounced drop in the euro area and goes into negative
territory for one year, while in the US the scal stimulus allows this bloc to escape having
negative annual ination rates.
23Alternative congurations were tested, with little change in the interpretation of results. In presenting results,
we chose a Government consumption shock for the US and a VAT tax shock for the euro area because of the
higher importance of VAT taxes in the scal stimulus packages for the latter.
17Figure 4: Co-ordinated and unco-ordinated scal reactions
185 Fiscal policy multipliers in the ZLB
As shown in the previous sections, scal policy can play a role in overcoming the ZLB, in
particular via its eect on demand. In this section, we take a dierent perspective: we analise
if and how the usual scal multipliers are aected when the economy is in a deep recession or
when the ZLB is binding. The idea that scal multipliers are higher in the ZLB is recurrent in
the literature (see e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009)), and is worth exploring in
EAGLE.
The exercise is twofold. First, we assess whether the economy's responses to scal shocks
in times of economic recession dier from those obtained under more "normal" circumstances.
Second, we evaluate the responses in a situation where the economy temporarily hits the ZLB,
based on the exercise in the previous sections. If the model was entirely linear, the scal mul-
tipliers should not change when the starting conditions change. To the extent that they dier,
they point to important non-linearities in the model.
If EAGLE was a strongly non-linear model, any change in the initial conditions of a scal
shock would change its impact. There lies the interest in comparing the impact of a given scal
shocks with and without a pre-existing recession. If ination and output are initially signicantly
below the steady state due to the induced recession, they may respond dierently to the scal
shock. A second source of non-linearity is the ZLB itself. When the ZLB is hit, the interest
rate ceases to react and so the macroeconomic impact of scal shocks is likely to change relative
to the non-ZLB case. In summary, non-linearities may become apparent either by the cyclical
position of the economy or by the loss of monetary policy exibility under the ZLB.
The exercise conducted consists in comparing the impact of the government consumption
shock described in the previous sections, conditioning on the presence or absence of the ZLB.
We have chosen to carry out the analysis for the government consumption shock for three main
reasons: in the rst place, it is among the most powerful scal shocks analysed previously; in
the second place, it is the most common in actual scal programmes; nally, its impact on the
economy is among the simplest to understand in models like EAGLE.
19In order to identify these eects we conduct three simulations. In the rst simulation (simu-
lation 1) we run a Government consumption shock equal to the one in section 4 (2.5% of GDP ex
ante), but this time starting the simulation assuming that the economy is at the steady state. In
simulation 2, we run the same scal shock but assume that there is an additional global recession
shock equal to the one considered in section 3.24 In this simulation we assume an unconstrained
monetary policy rule, i.e., the policy interest rate can become negative. Finally, simulation 3
replicates the results in section 4, i.e. a global recession shock plus a scal shock in the presence
of ZLB constraints.
Figures 5 and 6 present the results of the exercise. The gures again include panels for
ination, output, the interest rate and consumption for the three simulations. Note that as we
are computing the eect of the scal shock under dierent circumstances, in each simulation we
compute the deviation of each variable from its specic baseline, i.e baseline paths dier across
simulations. In each case, the baseline is similar to the simulation at hand once the scal shock
has been withdrawn. The baseline is thus the steady state in simulation 1, the response to a
global recession shock with an unrestricted interest rate in simulation 2, and the response to a
global recession shock with the ZLB restriction imposed in simulation 3. This way we are able
to isolate the specic eect of the scal shock in each simulation, which allows us to compute
the scal multiplier.
The results in Figures 5 and 6 show a remarkable degree of linearity in the model for the
rst two simulations, both in the case of the euro area and the US. In both areas, the two lines
overlap to a very large extent, which implies that, according to the model, the impact of a scal
shock on GDP and ination in a deep recession is similar to that in a neutral cyclical position.
On the other hand, the presence of the ZLB constraint leads to large non-linear behaviour, which
is more marked in the case of the US. This can be seen in the departures of ination, output and
consumption seen in the third simulation, compared with the other two. This departure largely
coincides with the period in which the nominal interest rate is constrained by the ZLB. This shows
24It should be noted that the main exercise in the text assumes a close to 8% drop in GDP in the euro area
and a similar impact elsewhere, past anything seen since the Great Depression. This seems to be an excellent
benchmark for the impact of initial conditions on the simulation.
20Figure 5: Government consumption multipliers in dierent situations: with and without reces-
sion, with and without the ZLB - Euro area











































































































21Figure 6: Government consumption multipliers in dierent situations: with and without reces-
sion, with and without the ZLB - US













































































































22that scal policy becomes particularly powerful in a ZLB situation, with a scal shock having a
much stronger upward impact on GDP and a less negative impact on private consumption. On
the other hand, the inationary impact of the scal shock is heightened, particularly in the case
of the US.25 Thus, in EAGLE, the ZLB does indeed aect the size of the scal multipliers and
more so in the US than in the euro area.
6 The scal programmes
In this section we simulate the eects of announced scal stimulus programmes in a ZLB context.
To do so we rely on the estimates in Manteu and Martins (2009) which are based on the OECD's
assessment of the scal packages published in OECD (2009).26 The plans include measures for the
euro area (split between Germany and euro area less Germany), the US and a bloc aggregating
Japan and the UK.27
The size of the scal packages had to be adapted to the EAGLE model, which implied some
judgment and the exclusion of some of the announced measures. The details of the shocks and
the choice of the relevant variables in EAGLE are shown in Table 1. All values are in percentage
deviation from steady state GDP. The stimulus package in the US is the largest, with stimulus
measures averaging over two percentage points of GDP in the years 2009 and 2010. Germany's
scal boost is the second largest in proportion of GDP, with measures amounting to 1.3 and
1.5 percentage of GDP in 2009 and 2010 respectively. Fiscal measures in the rest of the euro
area and in the rest of the world bloc (which in practice corresponds to the UK and Japan) are
less sizeable and are mainly concentrated in 2009. In the case of the US, the stimulus package
considered does not contain any measures aecting social insurance contributions or consumption
taxes, contrary to those of the other blocs.
25Other scal shocks lead to the same conclusion. The higher non-linear behaviour of the US bloc was found to
be linked to its lower price persistence, which increases the time spent in the ZLB, as already mentioned before.
Results of these alternative exercises are not shown in the interest of brevity.
26It should be noted that the the implementation of the discretionary measures may have diered somewhat
from the original plans. In addition, some governments have recently announced plans for scal consolidation but
this issue is beyond the scope of this paper and so we leave it for further research.
27The measures considered include only discretionary measures announced or implemented up to March 2009
which are considered to be taken in response to the crisis.
23Euro area Germany US UK and
excl. Germany Japan
2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010 2009 2010
Revenues
Tax on individuals 0.19 0 0.13 0.27 0.49 1.07 0.03 0.05
Tax on businesses -0.01 0.03 0.09 0.19 0.38 0.22 0.05 0.08
Social insurance
Employees -0.01 -0.01 0.29 0.37 0 0 0.03 0.01
Firms 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.02
Consumption taxes 0.01 0 0.03 0.03 0 0 0.2 0.07
Spending
Public consumption 0.28 0.04 0.51 0.52 0.9 1.06 0.48 0.08
Transfers 0.11 0.03 0.24 0.1 0.37 0.12 0.36 0.02
Total (in % of GDP) 0.59 0.1 1.28 1.49 2.15 2.48 1.18 0.33
Table 1: Size of the scal packages
The scal packages are simulated assuming that the economy is hit by the global recession
shock of section 3. As in section 4, the scal packages are assumed to be announced four periods
into the recession and implemented in the fth period. The implementation is set to coincide
with the entry into the ZLB, a situation similar to that actually faced by governments.28
The results of the simulations for the euro area are shown in Figure 7. The path for each
variable is the dierence relative to the case in which there is recession but no scal reaction.
As seen in the gure, the size of the foreseen packages is not sucient to signicantly change
the prole of the euro area interest rate. In fact, the inationary impact of the packages in the
euro area would be relatively small, so that the ZLB would not be overcome. Nevertheless, the
packages reduce the magnitude of the recession, leading to a smaller decline of consumption and
real GDP. In the case of the US, however, the announced scal packages would be suciently
powerful to keep the interest rate away from the ZLB almost all the time (see Figure 8). This is
due to the large size of the package being implemented, which has a signicant impact on GDP
growth and ination. Also noteworthy in all simulations is the amplication role of the ZLB for
the scal shocks which always have a stronger eect on GDP and consumption in the ZLB case
28A corollary of the previous section, on scal multipliers in the ZLB, is that the starting cyclical position of
the economies is of second-order importance. We have thus retained the recession in the previous sections, which
increases the comparability of all the exercises reported in the text.
24Figure 7: The impact of the planned scal packages: euro area








































































































than in the no-ZLB or no-recession cases.
Overall, the planned scal packages would help in reducing the magnitude of our benchmark
recession, including a sizeable boost during the ZLB period. The nding is particularly relevant
for the US, where both the size of the scal programme and the longer period spent in the ZLB
support activity. It should be stressed that the simulations disregard potential side eects of the
packages on the risk premium of government debt, which would reduce their impact.
25Figure 8: The impact of the planned scal packages: US











































































































This paper has investigated the use of scal policy instruments to overcome a zero lower bound
(ZLB) situation, using a large scale DSGE model. The model (EAGLE) includes 4 blocs for
Germany, the rest of the euro area, the US and the rest of the world. The ZLB situation is
reached in the model by assuming an exogenous huge global recession. The scal response is
always assumed to include temporary measures only. The results are in line with the literature
in that we generally nd scal policy stimulus measures to be eective in reducing the duration
of a ZLB episode. In addition, the scal multipliers are enhanced during the ZLB period, due to
the inability of monetary policy to react.
Of the several scal instruments that can be used, government consumption seems to be
among the most powerful instrument for overcoming the ZLB in EAGLE. However, both in
the euro area and the US, an increase in Government consumption amplies the decline in
consumption generated by the recessionary shocks. In this respect, the use of a VAT tax leads
to a smaller loss in consumption while also signicantly reducing the duration of the ZLB.
Transfers are most aected by the extent of Ricardian behaviour in the economy, from mildly
eective (when most consumers are non-Ricardian) to totally ineective. This policy should be
considered most risky, unless there is a clear view about consumer behaviour. Finally, the use
of an income tax would prolong the ZLB situation, which would be undesirable, even though it
would lead to a stronger exit from the recession.
It should be noted that even though the results suggest that scal policy may be useful in al-
leviating the negative consequences of a major recession leading to the ZLB, other considerations
suggest caution in using scal policy stimulus in the context of major recessions. To start with,
we assume that all the scal measures are temporary and credible. This implies, in particular,
that scal authorities announce a return to pre-recession levels of debt, to be achieved by future
scal consolidation. Agents in EAGLE believe the announcement and expect an episode of future
tightening, which actually increases the impact of the immediate scal expansion.
A loss of credibility brought about by rising public indebtedness would lead to higher sovereign
27bond risk premia which could seriously hamper or even eliminate the eectiveness of scal policy
as a tool to overcome the ZLB. In addition, as scal multipliers rise signicantly in a ZLB
situation, which, according to our results, appears to be particularly the case in the US, there is
an increased risk of temporary scal policy measures resulting in more stimulus than is needed,
especially if policymakers rely on traditional scal multipliers. This risk seems particularly high
for ination in the US. Thus, the risks of the economy falling into a deationary spiral need to
be carefully traded o with the risks of overstimulating the economy (in particular ination) and
longer-term issues related to the sustainability of public nances.
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